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The Competition for Trans-Pacific
Air Routes to Hawai'i, 1945—1959
OVER THE YEARS, varied and significant changes have affected the
Hawaiian Islands: violent volcanoes, the Polynesians' arrivals, the mis-
sionary era, the plantation economy, arrival of Asian immigrants, the
revolutions of 1893 and 1954, the rise of the International Long-
shoremen's and Warehousemen's Union in the 1940s and statehood
in 1959. Another significant change, the advent of commercial avia-
tion and large airplanes, that began in the 1940s, profoundly
impacted all facets of 20th century Island life and led commercial
airlines to compete vigorously to secure trans-Pacific routes from the
mainland to Hawai'i.
Aviation came to O'ahu seven years after the Wright brothers' first
short flights at Kitty Hawk, North Carolina. J. C. Mars, on December
31, 1910, piloted a primitive aircraft for about five minutes over the
Moanalua polo grounds before a fascinated crowd of onlookers. On
July 13, 1913, Lt. Harold Geiger, the army's first aviator to be billeted
in Hawai'i, arrived with a small support detachment, but this group
was soon withdrawn "because of the extreme danger of making flights
owing to the erratic and violent wind currents. . . . " The weather
bureau director felt that "flying with air machines over the Island of
Oahu is extremely hazardous."l
On February 13, 1917, Capt. John F. Curry, Sixth Aero Squadron
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commander, arrived in Honolulu, and a month later his unit began
permanent air operations flying seaplanes from Fort Kamehameha.
In 1918, the Army moved to Ford Island in Pearl Harbor. It named
the airdrome Luke Field in honor of Lt. Frank Luke, an American ace
killed earlier that year in France. During 1917 and 1918, army pilots
flew over O'ahu and crossed the channel to Moloka'i. There were no
regular landing fields and few navigational aids, making inter-island
air travel hazardous. After World War I, the army built airfields at
Puolo Point near Port Allen, Kaua'i, and at 'Upolu Point and South
Point, Hawai'i. O'ahu airfields included Luke Field, Wheeler Field,
and after 1930 Bellows Field at Waimanalo.2
Lt. Comdr. Robert D. Kirkpatrick led the first contingent of naval
aviators to a temporary base at Pearl Harbor on December 28, 1919.
Under his command were forty-nine officers and men who operated
four seaplanes. They soon shared Ford Island with the army. Ford
Island was one of the seven nationwide Navy air stations then in oper-
ation. By 1932, the navy had 32 aircraft at Ford Island.3
During the ig2os, friction developed between the navy and army
commands regarding operations on Ford Island. In 1928, the army,
seeking another airfield, selected 2,212 acres adjoining Pearl Harbor
and Fort Kamehameha. By 1935, the army completed one of its major
airfields: Hickam Field, named for Lt. Col. Horace M. Hickam, killed
in a 1934 airplane accident at Fort Crockett, Texas.4
Daring army and navy aviators dominated flying in the Islands dur-
ing the 1920s. Given the type of fragile aircraft in use, island air cur-
rents required a fearless personality to fly. Brig. Gen. William Mitch-
ell, assistant chief of the air force, arrived in late October 1923 to
undertake a survey of potential airfields in the Territory.5
In 1924, navy seaplanes started carrying mail between Honolulu
and Hilo while the Army called for a territorial airway system with
fields on Hawai'i, Kaua'i, Lana'i, Maui and Moloka'i to supplement
the two on O'ahu. The army hoped to develop a cadre of civilian
pilots who would engage in commercial aviation and undertake the
airmail service. The purpose, said army spokesmen, was to provide "a
nucleus from which pilots could be drawn in an emergency." The
army's hopes led the territorial legislature to call for inter-island air
service.6
The Inter-Island Steam Navigation Company organized the Inter-
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Island Airways in January 1929, the first commercial air operations in
the Islands. Before starting operations, the fledgling company sought
a United States airmail contract, but post office officials said that no
contract could be awarded until the company had its airplanes flying.
It was not until 1934, after almost five years of service and a debt of
$58,000, that a mail contract arrived, just in time to ward off eco-
nomic disaster for Inter-Island Airways.7
On November 11, 1929, commercial inter-island air service began
as two Sikorsky amphibian planes, the Hawaii and the Maui, left John
Rodgers Field, O'ahu's first civilian airfield named for Comdr. John
Rodgers, at 9:30 a.m. for Hilo with a stop-over at Maalaea, Maui. After
a ceremony in Hilo, the two planes returned to Honolulu, arriving at
5:00 p.m. The next day a flight was made to Kaua'i. By 1932, Inter-
Island had daily passenger service to Moloka'i, Lana'i, Maui, and
Hawai'i and thrice-weekly service to Kaua'i. The airline reduced travel
time by boat between Honolulu and Hilo from one and one-half days
of a rough sea voyage to 100 minutes of comparatively smooth flying.8
Hawai'i's distance from the United States mainland offered a chal-
lenge to aviation. The military made several efforts to fly from the
West Coast to O'ahu. In August 1925, a squadron of three navy
PN-gs tried to bridge the waters. One seaplane failed to take off while
another ditched off the California coast. The third, captained by
Comdr. John Rodgers with a crew of four, ran out of fuel northeast
of Maui. After rigging a makeshift sail for the downed craft and drift-
ing, the crew was rescued by a submarine.9
Two army aviators, Lts. Lester J. Maitland and Albert F. Hegen-
berger, were the first to cross the Pacific, arriving on O'ahu on June
28, 1927, in the Bird of Paradise, an army tri-motor Fokker. Soon after
this flight, Ernest Smith and Emory Bronte, two civilian pilots, left
Oakland on July 14, 1927. Encountering strong high head winds, they
ran out of fuel and crashed in an algaroba grove east of Kamalo on
Moloka'i's south shore.10
TRANS-PACIFIC COMMERCIAL AVIATION
By the mid-1930s, Hawaii stood at the threshold of trans-Pacific com-
mercial flights, with airplanes about to change the Islands' economy
and way of life. At the same time that Inter-Island Airways prepared
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for its first inter-island flight, Walter Dillingham helped found the
Pacific Zeppelin Transport Company. Other major investors were
the W. A. Harriman Company and Lehman Brothers of New York.
Comdr. Jerome C. Hunsaker, vice president of the Goodyear Zeppe-
lin Company, planned to operate two helium-filled dirigibles between
California and Hawai'i, a 36-hour flight. The plan faltered when the
federal government failed at that time to subsidize overseas transport
service. Two years later, the advent of Pan American World Airway's
(Pan Am) China Clipper made dirigibles outmoded for passenger
service.] x
A spectacular transportation change began when Pan Am inaugu-
rated its trans-Pacific air mail and passenger service in 1936. Pan Am
had already pioneered long trans-oceanic air routes. On the after-
noon of November 22, 1935, the China Clipper, a Glen Martin Com-
pany flying boat, with a flight crew of seven, left its Alameda base and
lifted off San Francisco Bay bound for Pearl Harbor and its mooring
site at Pearl City. Its payload consisted of 1,879 pounds of mail and
14 passengers. The seaplane arrived at Pearl City after a flight time
of 21 and one-third hours, two hours behind the scheduled time of
18 to 20 hours.
The China Clipper had reduced the travel time between the West
Coast and Hawai'i from five days by steamer to one day by air. With
only first class seats, the one-way first-class fare from Alameda to
Honolulu was $360. The clipper could carry 75 passengers, but never
more than 30 passengers were accommodated because the first prior-
ity was mail. Pan Am operated its trans-Pacific route largely because it
had received a federal government mail subsidy, but the flying boats
with low payloads and high operational costs kept the airline in red
ink.12 During World War II, land-based airplanes replaced the flying
boats.
After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941,
the airplane revolutionized naval warfare in the Pacific, making battle-
ships obsolete. The impact of aviation during World War II paved the
way for an explosion in commercial aviation that made tourism a
major support of Hawai'i's economy. By war's end, Pan-Am's land-
based aircraft carried bigger payloads, and its airplanes now landed
at John Rodgers Field.
In the months after World War II, the Matson Navigation Com-
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pany's Lurline shuttled 722 first-class passengers every six days across
the Pacific Ocean, but the luxury steamship's days were numbered.
Because the airplane had proved during the war to be reliable in car-
rying passengers and freight, Island and mainland entrepreneurs saw
a golden opportunity in obtaining the right to fly passengers to
Hawai'i.
Even as the war was ending, the United States Civil Aeronautics
Board (CAB) held hearings to determine which airline would join
Pan Am in flying passengers from the West Coast to Hawai'i. On
March 17, 1945, George Lycurgus, owner of the Volcano House on
Kilauea Crater's rim on the Big Island, expressed his concerns to Sec-
retary of the Interior Harold Ickes about the proposed trans-Pacific
route. He assumed that the "next contenders in line" were Hawaiian
Airlines (HAL) and the Matson Navigation Company. He felt that the
record of the Inter-Island Navigation Company, the parent owner of
HAL, showed it to have "followed the worst evils of monopolies." As
for Matson, he claimed that it too had "always played the freeze-out
method." While he could not prove it, Lycurgus believed that inter-
locking directorates had led to the lack of transportation competi-
tion in Hawai'i. Thus he objected to both of the companies securing
the air route.13
HAL President Stanley Kennedy, Delegate to Congress Joseph Far-
rington, and the Honolulu Chamber of Commerce lobbied hard on
behalf of the two carriers to join Pan Am in connecting the territory
with the mainland. All three expressed the caveat that any company
chosen had to have a demonstrated interest in the Islands' welfare.
Thus, they opted for either HAL or Matson, if not both.14
Both HAL and the Matson Navigation Company filed applications
to join Pan Am in regular schedules to Hawai'i. Northwest Airlines,
Western Air Lines, United Airlines, the Ryan School of Aeronautics,
and The Ryan Aeronautical Company also applied. HAL, Western,
and United applied for routes from Los Angles and San Francisco;
Ryan applied only for the Los Angeles route. Matson requested both
California routes as well as those from Portland, Oregon, and Seattle,
Washington, while Northwestern Air Lines filed for the two north-
western cities.
On May 17, 1945, the CAB recommended granting the San Fran-
cisco route to the United Air Lines, believing that United with its
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already established mainland routes would provide the most conve-
nient air service to a "far larger segment of the public than any other
applicant." The final decision, however, rested with President Harry
Truman. CAB staff studies showed that 70 percent of registrants in
Hawai'i's hotels came from cities served by United; Western had but
30 percent. Pan Am objected to any other carrier. The board rea-
soned that while United would have a competitive edge, United's
mainland competitors such as TWA and Western would tend to favor
Pan Am when routing passengers to Hawai'i.
The Ryan companies and HAL were eliminated because they
seemed to lack prior experience to mount such a major undertaking.
The board saw no need for any service from the Pacific Northwest,
thus denying Northwest's and Matson's applications. The board
divided on making Los Angeles a terminal or co-terminal and denied
service because of the lack of an affirmative vote.
The CAB had paid considerable attention to Matson's application.
Matson argued that entering into air service was a progressive step
for the steamship company, and it argued that a denial would hurt its
operations, "including its ability to provide ships for the national
defense." The board found Matson's argument not convincing that
its freight service would suffer. The board believed that many people
would still travel to Hawai'i by ship and dismissed Matson's claim that
allotting the air service to the steamship company was necessary to
keep its ships ready for any national defense. Finally, the board
thought that Matson's dominant position in seagoing traffic and own-
ership of Honolulu's two major hotels, the Royal Hawaiian and the
Moana, could give it an unfair advantage over Pan Am.15
The CAB first sent its proposed decision (granting the San Fran-
cisco-Honolulu route to United) to the Department of Interior for
its review. Interior Secretary Julius A. Krug urged the board to con-
sider the minority's opinion that HAL be awarded the Los Angeles-
Honolulu route because that airline seemed best to meet the board's
test "that the location of Hawai'i, its complete dependence on trans-
portation for its economic existence, the regional character of its
traffic, and the large and inevitable increase of air traffic, lend force
to the argument that it should have access to service by a carrier whose
primary objective is to serve traffic to and from Hawai'i, and whose
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polices are dictated solely by the needs of that traffic." Krug also
objected to the CAB's denial of a route from the Pacific Northwest.16
In the aftermath of the aeronautics board decision, the political
pot began boiling. Congressman Richard Welch of San Francisco
telegraphed President Harry Truman on May 29, 1946, urging that
the Matson Navigation Company, that had provided passenger ser-
vice to the Islands for the past 64 years, be granted a certificate to
operate seaplanes between California and Hawai'i. Welch stated that
the navy had strongly recommended that an operator who would uti-
lize waterborne aircraft be permitted to fly the Pacific route. Welch
claimed that the navy could thus use these airplanes as an "auxiliary
aviation service in conjunction with steamship service over the same
routes."17
In its several applications to the CAB, Matson stated that it was the
only applicant that did not request a federal subsidy to carry the
United States mail. It would charge for the weight of the mail but
believed that it could make the air route a success using its own
money.18
With Matson and Northwest Airlines still seeking a certificate to fly
from the Pacific Northwest to Hawai'i, Senators Guy Cordon and
Wayne Morris of Oregon met with Edwin A. Locke Jr., special assis-
tant to President Truman, to argue for an air route from Portland
and Seattle to Hawai'i. Locke also met with F. A. Bailey, president of
Matson Navigation Company. Bailey claimed that the northwest route
was fully warranted regardless of who became certified. He again
stated that Matson was willing to use seaplanes or any aircraft that the
government might specify and there was much to be said for an effi-
cient and economical operation by "one company of both steamships
and airlines."19
On June 29, 1946, President Truman accepted the CAB's finding
that United Airlines be granted the right to begin air service from
San Francisco to Honolulu and join Pan Am in transporting passen-
gers between the mainland and the Islands. The president asked the
board to reconsider the granting of an air route between Los Angeles
and Honolulu, but he made no reference to a route from the Pacific
Northwest.
Matson representatives contacted the Department of Interior
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regarding the department's statement that an island airline was the
one to be preferred to provide the air service. Acting Secretary of the
Interior Oscar L. Chapman, in response to Matson's inquiry, informed
the CAB chairman that the department never endorsed the concept
that a local or Island carrier be given the trans-Pacific route. The
department's position was that the carrier be one that would develop
the needed air traffic. Earlier, Secretary Julius Krug had indicated that
the Interior Department favored approving a northwest route but the
department did not endorse a particular carrier.20
By September 1946, pressure had built to the point that the CAB
reopened the Hawaiian Airline case. Edwin Locke Jr.'s prepared
hand-written notes about the growing controversy showed that the
CAB was unanimous in awarding the San Francisco route to United
Airlines. Two board members wanted to make Los Angles a
co-terminal for United, while two other members favored HAL to
offer direct service from Los Angeles to Honolulu. Locke observed
that the United States Post Office was also inclined to HAL but did
not insist on it. Locke indicated that HAL, owned by Inter-Island
Navigation Company (71%) and TWA (20%) had high rates for
freight and passengers. Others held the remaining shares (9%). One
CAB member, feeling that granting the route to HAL would require
higher subsidies than United would require, favored United.
As for the Pacific Northwest, Locke found that the board had been
unanimous in its opposition, the post office indicated that service was
not presently required, while the navy recommended that the route
was essentially for national defense but deferred to the opinion of
the CAB. Locke noted, too, the strong desires of the Oregon sena-
tors for a northwest route.21
Matson, hoping in 1946 of gaining either the northwest or the Los
Angeles route, purchased six D-C 4's and operated non-scheduled
service until United began regular service in May 1947. The CAB
rejected Matson's bid for a trans-Pacific route and held off granting
other routes to any carrier.22
Matson continued to press its case in February 1947. Matson,
Northwest Airlines, and Pan Am remained interested participants.
The charter service, Trans-Ocean Airlines, indicated it might become
an applicant as did Pacific Overseas Airlines that had a CAB certifi-
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cate to fly cargo over the Pacific route. Trans-Ocean Airlines became
an applicant while Pacific Overseas did not.23
On March 18, 1948, after lengthy hearings, the CAB authorized
Northwest Airlines to carry passengers, property, and mail between
the co-terminals of Seattle/ Tacoma and Portland for a period of five
years. This certification was temporary, and at the end of five years,
the board would determine if there was a need to continue this ser-
vice. At the same time, it denied the applications of Matson, Pan Am,
and Trans-Ocean Air Lines. President Truman, on April 22, 1948,
turned aside the CAB recommendation, thus blocking Northwest
Airlines' application. He believed that there was not justification "to
warrant the expenditure of government funds which would be
required." The CAB then reversed its earlier decision, thus denying
the northwest route.24
After considering a strong appeal from Senator Wayne Morse of
Oregon, Truman on July 29, 1948, reversed his stop order and told
the CAB that he approved the Northwest Airline application. In Sep-
tember, he also approved Pan Am's application to fly from Portland
and Seattle to the Orient and the South Pacific. This airline was, how-
ever, prevented from "any local shuttle service . . . between the Main-
land and Hawaii."25
By 1949, only Pan Am provided air service between Los Angeles
and Honolulu. The CAB again held hearings in 1949 and 1950 on
the "Reopened Hawaiian Case, Docket No. 851," as both United
Airlines and Pacific Overseas Airlines applied for the Los Angeles
route. One of United's arguments for increased service was the fact
that in 1948 it expected that Pan Am and it would carry 72,815 pas-
sengers and expected to reach 108,900 passengers in a few years.
After considering the pros and cons of the two applicants, the CAB
recommended that United Airlines' existing certificate be amended
to allow it to operate from San Francisco and Los Angeles. The Los
Angeles route was awarded on a temporary basis to expire in October
1953, the same time as the northwest route was to be reexamined.
Thus, in 1953, all routes would be examined to see if a need for such
services still existed.26
The CAB air route decisions precipitated Hawai'i's tourist boom
as the arrival of tourists increased annually. Developers built luxury
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hotels on every island. Following these decisions, the CAB approved
routes from mainland cities far removed from the West Coast. The
losers in this trans-Pacific air traffic were HAL and the Matson Navi-
gation Company.
INTER-ISLAND AVIATION
Since 1929, HAL held a monopoly on inter-island air traffic. Inter-
Island Airways changed its name to Hawaiian Airlines in 1940. The
airline had had no passenger injury in those 16 years. In 1946, it car-
ried 252,206 paying passengers. HAL was the first scheduled airline
to carry air freight under a published tariff schedule.27
By 1947, the CAB had two applicants seeking the right to operate
inter-island air service. Trans-Pacific Airlines, Ltd. (TPA; later known
as Aloha Airlines) sought a permit to carry passengers, property, and
mail. Trans-Air Hawaii, Ltd., sought permission to fly scheduled trans-
portation of property and mail.28 Trans-Air Hawaii, a non-scheduled
airline, had become the largest air cargo carrier in the Islands. It was
owned and operated by Air Force veterans. Islander Ruddy Tongg
led a group of Asian American businessmen to form TPA. Hung Wo
Ching, Aloha Airlines president, indicated in 1959 that TPA had
been formed because of treatment meted out to Asians during World
War II. Many Asians seeking passage on HAL had been refused pas-
sage. Stanley Kennedy Jr., retired president of HAL, countered that
the airline had not been prejudiced against Asians during the war. It
was military government employees who forced HAL to exclude
Asians. Kennedy opined that some was racial prejudice and the mili-
tary view that it was a risk to have Asians flying between Islands dur-
ing the wartime years. As late as 1946, HAL had no Asian employees
at its ticket counters; there were no Asian stewardesses or pilots.29
Whatever the cause, the result was the formation of a competing
airline.
In October 1947, the CAB denied TPA a temporary operating per-
mit, but the airline persisted in seeking scheduled island routes.30
Further investigation by CAB examiners led to the view that a second
airline was necessary to provide healthy competition to HAL. HAL,
launching a campaign in opposition to TPA's application, enlisted
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support from the Navy and from former Ohio Governor James M.
Cox, the 1920 Democratic candidate for president. Cox, father-in-law
of Stanley Kennedy Jr., sent President Truman a "Personal & Confi-
dential" letter on October 14, 1948, just prior to the 1948 presiden-
tial election, in which he detailed reasons to support HAL's position.
He suggested that there was not enough traffic to support two airlines.
He contrasted the Kennedy family, long time Island residents, with
Ruddy Tongg, "a man of very questionable character" and a "wartime
speculator" who had made considerable money.
Cox acknowledged that HAL had had a traffic monopoly with its
past ties to Inter-Island Navigation Company. However, a much more
serious problem was that 92 percent of TPA stockholders were Japa-
nese and Chinese. Cox found this fact disquieting and worrisome,
given Hawaii's place in national defense. His letter attached a list of
TPA stockholders. His own inquiries with Naval authorities into this
matter of TPA ownership, he wrote, found that they were disturbed
that Chinese and Japanese would dominate this sector of air trans-
portation. Cox noted, too, that Federal Judge J. Frank McLaughlin
ruled that TPA had been operating illegally by flying a regular sched-
ule. McLaughlin enjoined the airline from continuing this practice.31
Meanwhile, on October 22, 1948, Joseph O'Connell, CAB chair-
man, alerted the White House that his board decided unanimously
to grant a permit to TPA. In light of the Cox letter, Truman wanted
clear opinions from all interested executive departments. After receiv-
ing favorable comments, the President approved the application on
February 17, 1949.32
By 1950, TPA found itself in financial difficulty that made it unable
to offer a full flight schedule to the neighbor islands. Consequently
it applied for a $150,000 loan from the Reconstruction Finance Cor-
poration. At the same time, the company sought assistance from the
Department of Interior to help obtain a mail subsidy. The request
was made in light of a recent HAL request that it receive payment on
a mileage basis of sixty-one cents a mile. It had previously received
payment by the pound for mail carried. In seeking support from the
Department of Interior, TPA called attention to the recent dock strike
that had hurt island business, noting that a strike of aviation person-
nel, an earthquake, and/or financial instability would be a disaster if
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such an event interrupted the service of a single airline. Thus, having
two airlines made interruption of service much less likely.33
In January 1949, Cox, in what he said was his last word on the
"Hawaiian imbroglio," claimed that "persons closely associated with
that Chinese fellow [Ruddy Tongg] have sent post-election checks
to the Democratic Committee."34 However, the Cox faction did not
stop its lobbying on behalf of HAL. W. McNeil Lowry, chief, Wash-
ington Bureau of the James M. Cox Newspapers, sent a memoran-
dum in August 1950 to Rhode Island Senator J. Howard McGrath,
Democratic National Committee chairman, in advance of another
CAB hearing on certifying TPA to operate in Hawai'i. During the
1948 presidential campaign, Cox had helped President Truman dur-
ing his tour of Ohio, and Truman had told Cox that he was in his
debt. However, the president had not replied to Cox's two letters
asking for support of HAL. Lowry added that Cox felt that two recent
$5,000 contributions to the Democratic Party demonstrated TPA
stockholders appeared to be of greater importance than presidential
support by Cox and his chain of newspapers. Lowry concluded that
Governor Cox was satisfied to let the facts speak for themselves once
the "obvious political spurs were removed." Thus it was important,
said Lowry, to hold up the August 16 CAB hearing on TPA's extended
license request.35
Senator McGrath spoke to Truman about Cox's concerns, and the
president then replied to Cox on August 23, 1950. He stated that his
Bureau of the Budget had investigated the matter. He had then con-
cluded that the opinion of the CAB was persuasive and he had reluc-
tantly approved the original license for TPA in 1949. Now he under-
stood that HAL was seeking an increase in mail pay while TPA sought
an airmail subsidy. McGrath's information made it necessary to reex-
amine the current application. Truman said that the CAB would not
be influenced by political considerations but even so he would ask
that "special precautions be taken to avoid even the appearance of
evil."36
It was common knowledge in Hawai'i's aviation industry, said
G. A. Selig, a Civil Aeronautics Administration aircraft control spe-
cialist, that HAL would strongly resist any provision or requirement
that would hurt the airline. It was expected that HAL would threaten
political pressure to get its way. On the other hand, HAL seemed
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resigned to competition from TPA and was prepared to accept the
second airline. Selig added that competition was bound to help air
travel for islanders.37
A. William Barlow, Hawai'i regional attorney for the Civil Aeronau-
tics Administration, on October 31, 1950, wrote to Merwick Ross, a
staff officer for the Assistant Secretary of Commerce, about the grow-
ing HAL-TPA controversy. CAB investigators reported that charges
were being alleged that contributions by TPA officials were "illegally
made," which could make certification of TPA a political payoff. A
CAB investigator discovered that Ford Studebaker, a HAL vice-presi-
dent, had recently contributed $2,500 to the Democratic National
Committee. This was unusual, for Studebaker was "not in a position
to make such a large contribution and the source of this money can
easily be viewed with suspicion" given the pending applications of the
two companies. The CAB investigator noted that directors and offi-
cers of HAL were traditional Republicans, and Studebaker had never
made a contribution to the Democratic Party that compared to his
recent $2,500 contribution. On the other hand, TPL's officials had
for a number of years contributed to the Democratic Party. The inves-
tigator found the $5,000 contribution of Sai Chow Doo was one that
he could well afford, unlike Studebaker's contribution.38 Cox later
reiterated his views in a December 13, 1950, letter to Senator Howard
McGrath.39
Charges that ownership of TPA by persons of Asian descent con-
stituted a potential national security risk were advanced during the
era of McCarthyism. Harry S. Truman Presidential Library files relat-
ing to TPA contain reports regarding 13 highly educated persons of
Asian descent. Eleven were born in Hawai'i, one was born in China,
and one was born in Japan. Four Caucasians were also investigated.
David A. Benz, manager of Tongg Publishing Company and assistant
to President Tongg of TPA, underwent particular scrutiny. Benz had
become active in Democratic politics. At the time of Hawaii's Dem-
ocratic Party split in 1950, he was identified by the opposition as a
possible member of the party's "left wing." When the right wing
walked out of the party's convention, Benz was a delegate, but he was
absent from Hawai'i and did not participate in the convention's con-
troversy. Interviews with Col. Kendall J. Fielder of army military intel-
ligence, and Foreman Thompson, a special traffic representative for
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TPA, both showed that there was no reason to believe Benz to be dis-
loyal to the United States. Territorial Governor Stainback, when inter-
viewed, stated that he did not know Benz but indicated that Benz was
"not one of those on his list which presumably includes all subver-
sives within the Hawaiian Islands." Both Stainback and Fielder favored
competition in island air transportation.40
The decision of granting TPA the right to carry mail kept being
delayed. David Benz' February 6, 1951, letter to White House staff
member Philleo Nash expressed TPA's frustration. He related that
HAL had been consistent in its criticism of the multiracial composi-
tion of the TPA board of directors even before TPA gained its tem-
porary Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity in February
1949. After certification, HAL then made allegations through the
navy department that TPA board members of Chinese and Japanese
ancestry were not loyal to the United States. This, Benz believed, had
caused a delay in certification, and the three to four months' delay
caused serious financial loss to TPA. In June 1951, HAL renewed the
allegations, leading a new investigation of the board. Benz acknowl-
edged that he too was investigated because of his connection with the
Democratic Party. All charges proved to be unfounded.
Benz felt that the HAL charges were a further effort to delay TPA's
mail contract application. He charged that HAL knew it could not
convince the CAB or the White House to turn down the mail con-
tract application and thus sought delaying tactics, knowing that
TPA's financial situation was shaky and could not survive without the
mail contract.
Benz concluded with the thought that some persons were upset
that Americans who were not Caucasians saw fit to organize TPA. It
also seemed a major sin that one of the executives was active in the
Democratic Party, while HAL executives had long been leading sup-
porters of the Republican Party.41
In March, the CAB rendered a majority decision awarding TPA
the right to carry mail on its Hawaiian air routes and recommended
that the president accept the decision. Truman did so.42 In 1954, TPA
received a permanent certificate but by then it had lost $1,000,000.
The board of directors named Hung Ho Ching as president in 1958.
Ching sought an unsuccessful merger with HAL. He then led TPA
TRANS-PACIFIC ROUTES TO H A W A I I 2 1 3
into a reorganization and secured a large mainland loan. Out of
these efforts came Aloha Airlines.43
By the time of statehood in 1959, commercial aviation had become
part of everyday life for Island residents. For years, from the days of
the missionaries, the only way for visitors to reach Hawai'i was by sail-
ing ship and by steamship. The number and size of these ships, as
well as the Islands' few hotels, severely limited the number of tourists
who could come to the Islands. But today, every few hours, planeloads
of mainland and Asian tourists descend on Hawai'i to enjoy its cul-
ture, its climate, its landscapes and seascapes. Island residents find it
easier and more comfortable to commute between islands. Commer-
cial aviation is among the most significant changes to affect the
Hawaiian Islands.
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